United Nations E/2017/SR.36

Economic and Social Council

Distr.: General
25 October 2017

Original: English

2017 session
28 July 2016-27 July 2017
Humanitarian affairs segment

Summary record of the 36th meeting
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 22 June 2017, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Schulz (Vice-President) ..... (Germany)

Contents

Agenda item 9: Special economic, humanitarian and disaster relief assistance (continued)

Panel discussion: "Protracted crises: Meeting needs and reducing needs, risk and vulnerability"

This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of the present record to the Documents Management Section (DMS-DCM@un.org).

Any corrected records of the public meetings of the Council at this session will be reissued for technical reasons after the end of the session.

GE.17-17450 (E) 240817 250817

1717450

Please recycle

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

Agenda item 9: Special economic, humanitarian and disaster relief assistance (*continued*)

Panel discussion: "Protracted crises: Meeting needs and reducing needs, risk and vulnerability"

1. **The President** said that the panel would discuss the drivers of protracted humanitarian crises, the humanitarian challenges faced and possible ways forward, including approaches that would meet people's needs and systematically reduce need, risk and vulnerability and thereby contribute to achieving the vision of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, that no one should be left behind. The panellists would examine how both humanitarian assistance and development cooperation could work in protracted settings in new and better ways.

2. **Mr. O'Brien** (Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator), moderator, said that he was pleased to note that the new way of working to meet and reduce needs and reduce risk and vulnerability in protracted crises proposed in 2016 had been embraced. All stakeholders had a role to play in applying the new way of working in practice and ensuring that results led to meaningful change in the lives of the world's most vulnerable crisis-affected people, an unprecedented 141 million of whom made up the humanitarian caseload. If they were to populate a single country, it would be the tenth largest in the world, its life expectancy would be about 24 years shorter than the global average and its child mortality rate 10 times higher. As protracted crises became the norm, inequality mounted and vulnerability linked to climate change grew, the scale and scope of humanitarian suffering was set to increase and it would continue to stretch the humanitarian system beyond its capacity to cope. In the past decade, humanitarian funding requirements had increased by almost 400 per cent and the number of people targeted for assistance had more than tripled.

3. It was not enough simply to strive to keep people alive, safe and healthy, as only treating immediate needs would not lift them out of crisis but would trap them in a perpetual cycle of need. As the Secretary-General had said on taking his oath of office, the system must work together from the beginning of a crisis to support effective communities, address structural and economic impacts, and help prevent a new spiral of fragility and instability. That meant delivering coherent, long-lasting solutions that addressed both the symptoms and the root causes of crises. At the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, nine United Nations agencies and the World Bank had agreed to adopt a new way of working towards collective outcomes focused on reducing need, risk and vulnerability over multi-year time frames, with each institution working to its unique comparative advantage. Since then, progress had been made at both the policy and the practical levels. A steering committee had been set up to guide joint analysis, planning, coordination, leadership and financing of the response in the four countries at risk of, or experiencing, famine — Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen — while development partners were actively working to shore up resilience and reduce needs. However, barriers still remained.

4. Headquarters needed to encourage their country and regional staff to try new approaches to reduce needs, risk and vulnerability, and to provide coherent support across the humanitarian-development nexus. There was also a need for greater risk-sharing among other stakeholders to make it possible to innovate and enhance efficiency and impact. It was necessary to map out the tools and approaches that had been proven to work to support better coordinated strategies that could be adapted to different contexts. It was important to work with donors to move towards financing that incentivized working together to deliver on collective responsibility and to support increased training for even better financial skills for resident and humanitarian coordinators and other field staff. While there would remain a need for principled humanitarian action, structures and processes, it was necessary to find better ways to coordinate around the delivery of agreed common objectives that brought humanitarian and development actors into closer collaboration from the very onset of a crisis. The focus of each action must always be the people whose lives had been torn asunder by crises.

5. **Ms. Gaviria Betancur** (Adviser to the President of Colombia on Human Rights), panellist, said that Colombia strongly believed that the new way of working was the only responsible path to adopt in the current context of global upheaval. Her country's signing of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace had been a momentous step following more than 50 years of conflict, and efforts were now being concentrated on implementing the Agreement in such a way that no one was left behind. However, it was important to understand the challenges faced in doing that and managing the post-conflict transition. The armed conflict had affected 20 per cent of the Colombian population — more than 8 million victims — of whom 85 per cent had been displaced, 75 per cent lived in urban areas, 35 per cent were children and 13 per cent belonged to ethnic minorities. The Government had committed itself to alleviating the suffering of the Colombian people even before the end of the conflict and had designed and implemented policies to protect victims' human rights. Measures that directly or indirectly benefited the displaced population included the establishment of an official, reliable Central Register of Victims, a long-term human rights system and strategy up to 2034, and a policy for victims up to 2021. Work had begun on making reparations to victims before the conflict had ended, and more than 700,000 persons, including victims of displacement, had already benefited. Colombia was the only country in the world to have taken such innovative steps in the area of reparations.

6. The Colombian Government was the primary humanitarian actor in the country, although the support of external humanitarian agencies was gratefully received. Reparations were provided based on the findings of surveys conducted among victims on their needs, capacities and interests. A target of overcoming the vulnerability of 500,000 victims of displacement by 2018 had been set. A high degree of transparency, oversight and accountability was ensured in the implementation of such policies, with a focus on the participation of displaced persons themselves. The Final Agreement did not focus merely on the surrender of arms but sought to tackle the causes and consequences of the conflict. With that in mind, in order to promote rural development, the Agreement provided for the establishment of a land fund with 3 million hectares to be distributed to farmers, and there were also plans to formalize landownership, with a focus on rural women. Coordinated work was under way to formulate regional development plans, and social investment would be concentrated in rural areas with high levels of poverty that had been significantly affected by the conflict and where illicit crops were grown. The Agreement also provided for a comprehensive system of truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition, under which particular attention would be paid to displaced persons. The perpetrators of forced displacements would not be granted amnesty but would be held accountable. The planned Truth Commission would ensure that the Colombian people learned the real scale of the tragedy in terms of forced displacement.

7. The surrender of arms would shortly be coming to an end, after which it would be possible to definitively close that painful chapter in the country's history. However, challenges remained. For instance, criminal organizations, a small number of dissidents of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army) (ELN) sought to occupy areas previously held by FARC and continue to charge extortion payments, which posed a major challenge in terms of protecting leaders and communities and meant that not everyone was yet experiencing the positive impact of the peace. The response was not simply the deployment of military or police forces, but rather social investment, involving humanitarian and development actors, the Government and the communities themselves. New approaches were being tested and a new path was being forged.

8. Recommendations to other countries undergoing similar processes included strengthening information systems and constantly updating victim registers. For example, there were 7.2 million victims of displacement in Colombia, but it was necessary to ascertain how many were still in a situation of vulnerability and how many had found lasting solutions. It was important to establish measurable and politically and economically achievable targets and goals for overcoming vulnerability among the displaced population through inclusion in national and regional development plans and projects conducted jointly with international cooperation and humanitarian and development actors. Humanitarian

action with a focus on sustainable development was crucial to ensuring that lives were really transformed. Mechanisms should be developed to ensure effective participation in the design, implementation and follow-up of policies and to promote actions that enabled the comprehensive development of the displaced population. The overarching recommendation was to persevere in resolving conflicts, as that was the only way of putting an end to the suffering of the people.

9. **Mr. Kälin** (Professor Emeritus, University of Bern, Switzerland), panellist, said that it was often assumed that, as long as a conflict lasted or the effects of a disaster persisted, the vulnerabilities faced by internally displaced persons and host communities could only be mitigated by humanitarian action but not really addressed in ways that would help those affected to rebuild their lives. That perception was one of the reasons why humanitarian action all too often became protracted and, at worst, could create aid dependency. While there were some situations in which life-saving humanitarian action was the only option, there were many others in which much could be done to reduce the vulnerabilities of internally displaced persons and host communities even in the absence of peace. However, to do that, it was necessary to go beyond traditional humanitarian responses, particularly when internally displaced persons had found refuge in relatively stable and safe parts of the country.

10. Several essential lessons could be drawn: first, there should be a focus on what internally displaced persons wanted rather than simply what they needed. While they clearly needed shelter, food and access to health services, they wanted livelihoods and a place to stay where they had security of tenure. In other words, they wanted to rebuild their lives and become self-sufficient. Secondly, it should be acknowledged that protracted internal displacement was primarily a development and political challenge, as it involved a process of economic and social impoverishment that could also undermine the resilience and social cohesion of host communities and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. Reversing that process of impoverishment required development rather than humanitarian responses. There was a need for careful analysis of the often complex reasons, including legal, institutional and political obstacles, why internally displaced persons remained marginalized and could not rebuild their lives.

11. The third lesson was that, whenever possible, the emphasis should be shifted from solely providing life-saving assistance to helping internally displaced persons to move towards self-sufficiency as early as possible, without having to wait until a conflict was fully resolved or the impacts of a disaster had ceased. There were many good practices internationally that showed that such an approach was possible. It was necessary to ensure cooperation across humanitarian, development and political divides and to secure flexible multi-year humanitarian and development funding. All actors needed to combine their efforts to analyse the needs, vulnerabilities and capacities of internally displaced persons and their hosts, to identify the reasons why displacement was protracted, and to agree on and implement strategic, clear and quantifiable collective outcomes.

12. It must be recognized that efforts to address internal protracted displacement were successful if governments, using a whole-of-government approach, led efforts, as shown by the example of Colombia. The primary responsibility for assisting and protecting internally displaced persons and creating conditions conducive to a lasting solution lay with governments and not the international community. Local communities, including internally displaced persons and their hosts, were best placed to know their needs and should be considered as front-line actors. Governments should mainstream internal displacement in national and local development plans.

13. **Mr. Mokaya** (Deputy Regional Director for Africa, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)), panellist, said that his organization's 2016 report on protracted conflict and humanitarian action presented three key findings. The first was that protracted conflicts caused immediate and gradual degradation of infrastructure, services and livelihoods, with critical effects on health care, food security, water and education. Second, the mutation and fragmentation of long-lasting conflicts meant that different needs emerged and made responses more complex. The third finding was that protracted crises posed particular challenges for urban areas because the disruption of services had knock-on effects, as had

been seen in Yemen, for example, where the disruption of water services had resulted in a serious cholera outbreak.

14. As long as there were people behind the front lines in hard-to-reach areas, impartial and principled humanitarian action was imperative. In some cases, conflicts occurred in regions that were extremely underdeveloped and faced chronic issues of poverty, weak economies, fragile and unreliable public services and food insecurity. Developmental gains that might have been achieved started to be eroded and host communities that had to share their meagre resources with displaced persons or refugees quickly began to slide into a situation of humanitarian need. The people affected by conflicts were interested in solutions and responses that gave them hope and a sense of continuity to their lives. Addressing the cumulative impact of conflict meant not only meeting urgent needs, but strategically addressing long-term needs.

15. For ICRC, whether with the conflict was protracted or short-term, the principles of neutrality and impartiality were critical to ensuring acceptance, access and security during operations. In volatile and ever-changing environments, it needed to be agile and have the capacity to follow displaced populations: in South Sudan, for example, the use of light, temporary bases had made it possible to following the affected population through multiple displacements. It was important to have a high tolerance of the operational risks involved. ICRC focused on developing its capacity to have reactive, multidisciplinary structural support programmes to enable it to provide support to all categories of victims in areas such as health care, nutrition, access to water and legal assistance. In addition to addressing immediate needs, ICRC also focused on underlying normative issues. It attached great importance to building strong partnerships with local partners, in particular local Red Cross organizations.

16. **Ms. Clements** (United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees), panellist, said that the aims of the comprehensive refugee response framework were to ease the pressure on countries that welcomed and hosted refugees, build the self-reliance of refugees, expand access to resettlement in third countries and other complementary pathways and foster conditions that enabled refugees to return voluntarily to their home countries. The focus of the framework was not necessarily on the individual; rather, it supported national institutions in strengthening systems that served not only refugees, but also other at-risk groups. Many of the provisions on reception and admission, for example, applied to migrants, while efforts to address the root causes of refugee crises facilitated the return of internally displaced persons. The assistance provided to bolster the education and health infrastructure in refugee host countries and communities benefited the population at large. It was hoped that, through the framework, affected populations would develop the ability to care for themselves, rather than rely on external help, and not just survive, but thrive. Some lessons had already been learned: first, the work carried out should serve as a catalyst for national and international development action; secondly, the framework should offer support, including technical expertise, to other system-wide interventions; and thirdly, all humanitarian actors should have full knowledge of populations and their specificities in order for programming to be inclusive.

17. **Mr. Abdulla** (Deputy Executive Director, World Food Programme), panellist, said that, for the new way of working to prove successful, funding had to flow towards jointly identified plans and priorities. The greatest challenges in that regard included changing organizational and cultural mindsets, altering the perception that many donor countries had of the humanitarian-development nexus and, in that connection, finding ways to work across mandates. Results were being achieved in the four countries that were on the brink of famine, including South Sudan, where the World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations were collaborating in the transportation and delivery of equipment. While it was true that development assistance benefited governments, it was an overstatement to claim that it was not principled, neutral or properly targeted. It was important to work with governments and to have appropriate safeguard mechanisms in place. Funds should be as flexible as possible to enable rapid transitions from relief to development, and vice versa. The World Bank was to be applauded for its willingness to engage in humanitarian affairs, but greater coordination and dialogue were needed with actors on the ground to ensure that funds reached the most vulnerable.

18. **Ms. Eziakonwa-Onochie** (United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator in Ethiopia), panellist, said that the dual role of resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator made it possible to exert influence on both sides of the humanitarian-development divide. Ethiopia did not figure on the list of countries that were on the brink of famine because it was at peace, and so all parts of the country were accessible, significant improvements had been made to national infrastructure, and the Productive Safety Net Programme had helped to reduce the number of people who depended on relief assistance during periods of drought. The 2014-2016 El Niño event had affected over 10 million people in Ethiopia, but the country had been able to rely on a robust national system for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the Health Extension Programme in meeting the needs of malnourished children. The country was on a strong development trajectory, which helped it to manage the needs created by the severe drought that was currently ravaging the Horn of Africa. However, the fact that it was displaying leadership did not mean that it no longer required support.

19. In Ethiopia, common platforms had been established for development and humanitarian actors to ensure that humanitarian action was deployed in a manner that protected development gains, and funds had been allocated to reinforce development systems at the point of delivery. Through a mapping exercise, it had been determined that the development-oriented Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for All initiative had not been complementing the humanitarian assistance delivered in response to the El Niño-induced drought and so, following discussions among the Government, development investors and humanitarian actors, the decision had been made to front-load spending under the initiative so that it had a direct impact on the humanitarian situation. It had been noted that measles and acute watery diarrhoea were consequences of the drought and that not all children had received the necessary vaccinations. Consequently, development funds had been allocated to vaccinating children aged 15 years and under as swiftly as possible. To minimize the impact of the drought on school attendance rates the Government had also decided to use some development funds to guarantee the provision of food and water in schools.

20. It had been posited by some development actors that droughts should not be treated as emergencies, given that they were predictable and recurrent. In response to that argument, the emphasis in Ethiopia had shifted from a poverty-reduction approach to one based on long-term planning that took risks and vulnerabilities into account. In view of the foundations that had been put in place, Ethiopia could serve as a model for other countries seeking to strengthen the humanitarian-development nexus.

21. **The observer for the European Union** said that the European Commission had long been active in crises and had learned the importance of closer collaboration between humanitarian and development actors. Forced displacement was an area in which the Commission aimed to change its way of working, as captured in the Communication on Forced Displacement and Development that it had adopted in 2016. The Commission had adapted its approach to crises, including through joint missions and planning involving humanitarian and development services and improved coordination at headquarters and in the field. It was searching for better responses to protracted crises in urban contexts, exploring the potential for national social protection systems to bridge humanitarian and development assistance and seeking to promote cooperation with the private sector. In Ethiopia, it was working with the World Food Programme and the World Bank to implement the Productive Safety Net Programme. Protection remained key. In the push for development, specific vulnerabilities had to be borne in mind to ensure that no one was left behind.

22. **The representative of Germany** said that addressing protracted crises was high on her country's humanitarian agenda. Germany agreed that, in such crises, humanitarian needs should be met through multi-year financial commitments and, accordingly, was committed to reviewing its internal budgetary regulations, which currently provided for one-year funding windows. However, unlimited increases in multi-year commitments were not possible without affecting ability to respond flexibly to changing humanitarian situations. Different principles were attached to humanitarian and development funds. Thus, while the idea of being able to switch funds from relief to development work was interesting and worth pursuing, it would be extremely hard for Germany to put into action

under its existing budgetary regulations, which required that money should be used for its original purpose. It might be asked what the implications would be of a humanitarian actor using funding from a development partner and whether that would have any impact on the actor's ability to provide principled humanitarian assistance.

23. **The representative of Japan** said that preparedness was crucial to disaster response, and the central and local governments of Ethiopia were to be commended for their efforts in that respect. As a country particularly prone to natural disasters, Japan placed considerable emphasis on preparedness and disaster risk reduction and believed that crisis-hit communities should be rebuilt to a better standard than prior to the crisis. It was committed to promoting the global targets under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, not only bilaterally but also in collaboration with international organizations and the private sector.

24. **The representative of Australia** said that the Australian aid programme included crisis modifiers in its development assistance and set differentiated priorities depending on the context that were also relevant in situations characterized by both disaster and conflict. All actors should move towards multi-year approaches to protracted crises as they were key to fulfilling the Grand Bargain on humanitarian financing. Multi-year funding provided the opportunity to increase efficiency and effectiveness by reducing administrative burdens and enabling longer-term planning. It also helped donors to improve performance through stronger monitoring, evaluation and reform and to better align humanitarian, development and diplomatic efforts. Australia had announced a $A 220 million three-year package for Syria in 2016 and a $A 100 million three-year package for Iraq in April 2017; it was currently working on multi-year funding commitments in relation to other crises. He would appreciate an update from the agencies on moving towards multi-year planning and programming and would like to know what were the main challenges to be overcome in order to increase the level of multi-year funding.

25. **Mr. O'Brien** (Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator) said that he was very grateful for the Government of Australia's multi-year commitment to the Central Emergency Response Fund, which had made a considerable difference in terms of predictable financing.

26. **The observer for Switzerland** said that protracted crises were the new norm; accordingly, the need now was for sustained collective efforts that also respected humanitarian principles. In that connection, to reach a common understanding among actors, joint analysis should be carried out in cooperation with national and local actors. It would not necessarily lead to joint programmes, but in many situations the goal should at the very least be to define common strategic focuses or common outcomes. It was clear that the achievement of common outcomes was contingent on flexible and predictable funding, for example through multi-donor or multipurpose trust funds.

27. **The representative of the United Kingdom** said that it was to be welcomed that tools and frameworks were being put in place to provide long-term solutions for internally displaced persons, refugees and host communities. They encouraged the involvement of development and private sector actors in humanitarian efforts. However, the new approach would require a change in mindset and attitudes, as well as the adaptation of institutions and methods of work with a view to achieving change on the ground. One way of doing that was to plan better for the long term through multi-year commitments that supported governments in making the necessary investments and reforms. Some 85 per cent of British humanitarian funding was multi-year, and both humanitarian and development assistance were covered under a single budget.

28. In addition, it was necessary to create stronger partnerships by collaborating more effectively, particularly at the country level, and by involving the private sector. More could also be done to better anticipate risks and crises, as demonstrated by the introduction in Ethiopia of shock-responsive social protection programmes and risk insurance. Greater effort should be made to avoid leaving anyone behind by better tackling exclusion, by ensuring that programmes systematically encompassed refugees, internally displaced persons and other affected populations and by supporting freedom of movement and access to services and labour markets. Lastly, the political drivers and underlying causes of

displacement, crises and lack of access should be better addressed. The Grand Bargain was a great opportunity to deliver some of the required changes, to join up data from different risk analyses and assessments, to coordinate better and to develop shared long-term plans. Ultimately, in responding to protracted crises, he suggested that donors should strive to be as developmentalist as they could be and as humanitarian as they must.

29. **Mr. Abdulla** (Deputy Executive Director, World Food Programme) said that development funding was often provided with specific objectives and results in mind and was allocated on the basis of strict criteria. The allocation of development money to bilateral programmes should be more thoroughly thought through to ensure that it was available for different uses. That might require changes in the conditions and targeting of both donors and recipients but, if done correctly, could lead to an increase in multi-year funding. Any joint actions with the World Bank should be focused on where the best results could be achieved, for instance in building resilience. While the recent droughts in Ethiopia had been worse than the famous 1984 drought, their impact had been far less because development funding had been put towards prevention. Furthermore, shock-responsive social protection systems were an example of a long-lasting contribution by donors that required minimal physical presence.

30. **Ms. Clements** (United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees) said, regarding engagement with the World Bank, that the cases of Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia were examples of the successful leveraging of complementarities between the expertise of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on refugees and displacement and the World Bank's approach. Another early example had been their joint work in Lebanon and Jordan in the context of the Syrian conflict, which had also led to collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the incorporation of national development plans into the response. It was particularly important for the international community to support national governments and host communities, especially where very progressive policies had been introduced. For example, refugee legislation in Ethiopia was on the cusp of being amended to enable refugees to support themselves and to promote mutual assistance between refugees and host communities.

31. Multi-year planning had been piloted in 6 countries and later expanded to 22, with the hope that it could be extended to most of the Office's programming while retaining the flexibility required in new situations of displacement. It was crucial to have the bilateral actors present during humanitarian efforts given that, in many situations, displacement occurred in the poorest, least developed areas. Lastly, the private sector was not merely a source of funds but could also help find longer-term solutions, such as in Ethiopia, where a project had been launched that integrated education, livelihoods and energy and benefited both refugees and host communities. Focusing on economic considerations was a way of including refugees in the response from a development perspective, as they would be remaining in the host country for some time. Another example was the opening of a solar energy farm at the Azraq camp for Syrian refugees in Jordan, which would be a tangible contribution to local development even once the refugees had left.

32. **Mr. Kälin** (Professor Emeritus, University of Bern, Switzerland) said that collective outcomes could be defined at various levels and be more or less ambitious. One example was that of Colombia, whose national development plan set the objective, together with indicators, that half a million internally displaced persons should no longer be in a vulnerable situation by the end of 2018. In countries where displacement was chiefly an urban issue, a collective outcome could be, for instance, the legalization of 5 to 10 settlements within two to three years. In that type of situation, distinguishing between development considerations and humanitarian concerns would first require an analysis of why people were living in irregular settlements without access to services or urban infrastructure for such long periods. In some places, it might be a matter of discrimination while in others, it might be that the authorities could provide services and infrastructure only in regular areas or that budget allocations were calculated based on the official population rather than the real population. Accordingly, the solution in such cases might entail legislative changes or capacity-building at the level of local governments and relevant ministries. Another collective outcome in terms of improving living conditions in settlements could be to ensure livelihoods for 1,000 internally displaced households in rural

areas by arranging, in areas with a surfeit of land but few labourers, non-exploitative rental contracts with landowners to enable internally displaced persons to work the land. Naturally, the introduction of such arrangements would require liaising with the ministry of agriculture and development actors and would likely lead to the discussion of other issues, including facilitating market access. Thus, collective outcomes must be defined on the basis of a comprehensive analysis that looked at both humanitarian needs and vulnerabilities and development indicators and capacity, which would obviously entail significant changes to the way the actors worked.

33. The observance of humanitarian principles was not a black and white issue and depended on the context, whether that was a conflict or the follow-up to a peace agreement. The principles were not an end in themselves but were also a tool to ensure humanitarian access during armed conflict. Nevertheless, it was important to look at how to define collective outcomes and ensure that the various actors communicated with each other in order to best serve affected populations. Collective outcomes did not mean taking a cookie-cutter approach but, rather, taking the same resources and coordinating them differently. It was then necessary to agree on the role of the local government, UNDP, the International Organization for Migration and other actors. In protracted crises, however, it was important to ensure that collective outcomes were formulated and implemented in keeping with human rights guarantees, relevant international standards and the Sustainable Development Goals, among other considerations. Where that was achieved, there was minimal tension between humanitarian principles and development approaches. It was possible, of course, to define collective outcomes that were completely discriminatory and not at all in line with international standards, in which case humanitarian actors should simply refuse to take part.

34. **Ms. Gaviria Betancur** (Adviser to the President of Colombia on Human Rights) said that the first recommendation for successfully addressing the issue of internally displaced persons was that there had to be political will at the highest level but also at the local and executive levels. Then, a legal and institutional framework was necessary. In the case of Colombia, a decree containing agreed indicators had been issued, after consultation with various ministries and civil society, and that had then been incorporated into the national development plan. It was also necessary to have the best possible data. In that connection, Colombia had conducted a survey of 28,000 internally displaced households in 2010 and another under the current President to constitute a baseline for measuring actual improvement in their lives. Cooperation among the various actors and stakeholders was key. Moreover, it was crucial to consider psychosocial aspects and to involve internally displaced persons in the solution in order to prevent a victim attitude from taking hold. Lastly, when a government took the lead in a process, it was vital for donors and humanitarian and development actors to align themselves with the government's goals, which could, understandably, be quite a challenge.

35. **Mr. O'Brien** (Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator) said that the new way of working had also proven successful in the Central African Republic and Somalia, contributing to the evidence base that was crucial to engaging the donors. The leadership provided by United Nations resident and humanitarian coordinators, who performed a dual function under the new system, helped greatly in that task; professional development activities were being conducted to equip them for their new role.

36. **Ms. Eziakonwa-Onochie** (United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, Ethiopia) said that combining the functions of resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator facilitated coherence. The Sustainable Development Goals formed the basis of all development action and should dispel any doubts about the principles underpinning development. One concern with shifting funding between development and humanitarian actions was that, if investment in development was not sustained, humanitarian needs would simply be prolonged. When it came to adaptability, she cautioned against pressing for immediate results. People did not change their ways overnight and it was important for donors to understand that the process required time, space for learning, patience and dialogue.

37. In the Ethiopian context, collective outcomes meant converging around the Productive Safety Net Programme in order to create predictable responses. Populations that

might be affected by future shocks needed to be integrated into that process. Humanitarian action must not operate in parallel with development efforts, but instead be merged into a single system of delivery. In Ethiopia, efforts to build resilience against water scarcity, for example, were hampered by the way in which funding was directed. Investment was traditionally directed on the basis of expected returns, rather than risk and vulnerability. As a result, areas that were vulnerable to chronic water shortages were left out. In order to address those shortcomings, development planning decisions needed to be based on need, not numbers.

38. **Mr. O'Brien** (Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator) said that, while the humanitarian-development nexus offered opportunities, it was not applicable to all contexts. Development required access and functioning markets.

39. **Mr. Mokaya** (Deputy Regional Director for Africa, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)) said that acceptance of humanitarian actors by all parties to a conflict, and the capacity to deliver without imperilling any segment of the affected population, were essential to humanitarian operations. Countries experiencing mass displacement and frequent shifts in alliances within their territory, in particular, greatly appreciated principled humanitarian action. ICRC had extended its activities to broader services such as health and nutrition in situations where other agencies had had no access. It was also involved in the rehabilitation of the main urban water system in the Central African Republic. It was encouraging to note that donors were increasingly aware that, in certain contexts, humanitarian organizations were the only agencies in a position to maintain basic services, although ICRC preferred to remain within the humanitarian basket.

40. **The observer for the Institute for Planetary Synthesis** said that the world was moving into a new era of synthesis, peace and harmony and the masters of ancient wisdom stood ready to guide humanity through that difficult transition towards the creation of a new world of sharing resources, trust, justice, peace, cooperation, solidarity and unity for all.

41. **The representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)** said that UNDP actively supported the new way of working by engaging in advocacy, cooperating with country teams, deploying additional planning and financing support where needed, compiling knowledge and experience and identifying obstacles. It was developing a cadre of professionals equipped to bring the new agenda forward, in cooperation with sister agencies. The new way of working was not about concepts and programmes, but about ending need. Investment in development and resilience and political engagement would pave the way.

42. **Ms. Clements** (United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees) said that the new way of working had created possibilities for new partnerships, attracted unprecedented political attention and been embraced by host communities and beneficiaries. Although the possibility of combining humanitarian and development approaches was exciting, the two systems must be combined in a way that embraced their complementarity and respected their differences with a view to producing collective outcomes for those in need.

43. **Ms. Gaviria Betancur** (Presidential Adviser for Human Rights, Colombia) said that overcoming protracted crises required institutional frameworks and capacities. States and their leaders needed to be willing to recognize mistakes, address challenges and engage in ongoing, transparent dialogue with all segments of society. Everyone must be brought on board in order to make collective outcomes sustainable and legitimate. Stakeholders needed to be ambitious and responsible at the same time and agree on realistic collective goals.

44. **Mr. Mokaya** (Deputy Regional Director for Africa, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)) said that protracted situations could only be resolved through respect for international humanitarian law, facilitation of humanitarian access for immediate and long-term relief and the formulation of political solutions to the root causes of the conflict. Improved complementarity between international, national and local actors and respect for minimum standards of impartiality were critical.

45. **Mr. Abdulla** (Deputy Executive Director, World Food Programme) said that humanitarian actors, host governments and donor governments were shifting away from viewing humanitarian and development action as two separate issues. The Sustainable Development Goals framework was highly principled and humanitarian, as leaving no one behind implied reaching those furthest behind first. In order to reach that goal, all stakeholders needed to work together as a team. In Ethiopia, development, prevention and preparedness activities had helped prevent famine during one of the worst droughts in decades. If that model could be emulated elsewhere, the solution was in sight. Building resilience wherever possible was crucial. Although conflict was one of the most pressing contemporary issues, it was unhelpful to view situations through that lens alone. Development action and funding could go a long way to alleviating the effect of natural hazards such as floods, droughts or earthquakes, for example, and prevent disaster.

46. **Mr. Kälin** (Professor Emeritus, University of Bern, Switzerland) said that reducing protracted internal displacement was a prerequisite for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. It was thus in the interest of States to monitor displacement situations over time in order to build a strong evidence base. The current discussion was not about humanitarian agencies handing protracted crisis situations over to the development community, but rather about improving cooperation. As protracted displacement undermined development, it must be mainstreamed throughout national and regional development plans and United Nations development assistance frameworks. Doing so would eventually obviate the need for humanitarian relief.

47. **Ms. Eziakonwa-Onochie** (United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, Ethiopia) said that the Kenyan-Ethiopian cross-border initiative to foster peace in the border regions illustrated the willingness of a growing number of host governments to take control of fragile situations. The international system must support such courage with capacities and resources. Fragile populations that had dropped off the development radar were trapped in a cycle of vulnerability. Countries that were making such efforts must be afforded support. Unfortunately, Ethiopia's nine pledges towards addressing the needs of refugees and host communities had been rewarded with the lowest level of funding in years. Countries that lived up to their responsibility needed more, not less, support and it was crucial for the donor community to remain engaged.

48. **Mr. O'Brien** (Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator), summing up, welcomed the successful implementation of the new way of working, which illustrated that change was possible. Collective outcomes could be achieved through various routes. Although it was essential to bridge the development-humanitarian divide, multi-year humanitarian funding was also critical. Releasing funds despite knowing that the results of the investment might not materialize for years required trust and several donors had shown their willingness to do so. As the humanitarian community shifted from being a funding recipient to becoming a place for investment, emphasis must be placed on continued principled action. The international system needed to learn how to manage the rhythm of two speeds, meeting immediate needs while strengthening systems and normative frameworks. A whole-of-society approach, joint analysis and multi-year programming and financing were prerequisites for delivering humanitarian and development action that left no one behind. Mutual trust was a vital ingredient for success.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.